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I: 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of an Industrial Commission affirmation of a Department of Labor 
redetermination that "employee" long-haul truckers were wrongly regarded as independent 
contractors. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
A redetermination and billing for unemployment taxes and penalties owed was issued to 
Western Home Transport, Inc. (hereinafter "Western") in September, 2011. An appeal was 
timely filed. A Hearing Officer Paul Kime took evidence on May 16, 2012. On the basis of the 
record and the precedent in Giltner v. Idaho Department of Commerce, 145 Idaho 415, 179 P3d 
1071 (2008), the field finding was sustained. Thereafter, on a further appeal, the Industrial 
Commission, without taking additional evidence or argument, also ruled against Western on 
October 2, 2012. The Appellant now seeks judicial review of those final holdings on the record 
developed below, per the arguments presented herein. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Western Home Transport, Inc. is a Boise based long-haul arranger which services the 
manufactured housing industry in the Treasure Valley. It accepts the consignment of oversized 
mobile home structures built by local factories and causes them to be delivered to consignee-
purchasers throughout the U.S. and Canada. It has five to seven salaried office employees upon 
whom it pays unemployment insurance. It does not employ any drivers and does not own any 
truck tractors. 
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Instead, it utilizes a "Western-Independent Contractor Term Sheet" (Hearing Exhibit "D", 
hereinafter ("Ex-D") to engage a professional and duly licensed trucker who owns and maintains 
his O\Vn rig for hire. Using its "Western Standard Lease Form", ("Ex-E") the trucker's tractor is 
leased for use in the hauls. Western has operated in this fashion without challenge, issuing Form 
1099's to the truckers for their self-filing for federal and state income tax purposes since 1996. 
None of Western's independent contract drivers has ever complained about this arrangement or 
applied for unemployment insurance. Instead, in 2011 Western was "selected to have an audit 
done" by the Idaho Department of Labor. (Transcript of Hearing held May 16, 2012) page 12, 
line 4, hereinafter (T 12, 4) 
At hearing, truck owner Darrel Robeson, one of Western's contractors, testified that he: 
a. owned his freightliner truck 
b. owned tools for the truck 
c. garaged the truck 
d. serviced the truck or did his own repairs 
e. Had his own CDL license, and social security card 
f. took mandated drug tests and medical exams at his own cost 
g. regarded himself as an independent contractor, in fact and per his contract with 
Western 
h. had the authority to accept or reject an offered trip, to work or not work, when 
Western contacted him with an offer 
i. set his own work start and stop times and vacation schedules, if working 
J. was paid per trip at the rate of seventy five percent of the line haul income, if working 
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k. at his sole discretion and cost, could and did hire others to work for or with him on the 
road 
I. typically labeled his truck with his name, his company name "Daschund 
Transportation" and also the phrase "leased to Western Home Transport" 
m. pays the fuel costs, fuel taxes, road taxes, tolls and traffic fines, as encountered from 
his own pocket. 
n. covers his own truck insurance and travel expense costs, including all motel and meal 
expenses. 
o. receives a 1099 from Western and pays his own income taxes 
p. has the authority to choose his own routes, even for oversized loads, on the rare 
occasion when they are not mandated on pre-designated roadways by DOT regulation and the 
specific description contained in a state issued trip-permit 
q. independently complies with DOT regulations on maximum driving hours, setting his 
own start and times and destination points 
r. is free to hire out his truck anytime to others, with notice to and leave of Western 
s. is paid by funds from Western being transferred into a "Comdata" account, which 
funds be accessed by use of a card device 
t. has his own DOT and/or Motor Carrier numbers, but uses Western's for their trips 
u. bears the risk and has the opportunity to make a profit or a loss on a trip (T 71, 3-
98,11) 
A second driver, Michael Byington, was also called at the hearing. His testimony was in 
accord with that of Robeson as to his range of independent judgment and action. (T 171, 7- 206, 
3 
14) 
Byington did clarify that he made several errors in understanding and filling out a 
questionnaire which had been sent to him. Marked State's Exhibit 10, he wrongly characterized 
thereon that the 75% of trip line haul income was a "salary", and acknowledged orally that he too 
had received the Form 1099's and simply took them to his accountant. (See Ex-A and See T 181, 
1-183, 24 for various confusions related to filling out the DOL form) Byington also more 
aggressively markets his personal driving business services to consignors and consignees then 
did Robeson. (T196, 5-197, 3 and 198, 13-199,21) 
For its part, Western obtains a bill oflading, offers it to a willing driver, requests and 
obtains a trip permit and does the necessary office-based, regulatory paperwork, including 
interstate fuel tax accounting, thereby relieving the driver of those substantial governmental 
compliance burdens. As consistent with and required by federal tax laws, (Ex B,C) Western 
treats all its contract drivers as independent entities. Only three of its current operators reside in 
Idaho. (T 210,6-9) Nearly all of the "requirements" imposed on such interstate, oversized load 
drivers, including those incorporated into the language of the independent contract with Western, 
are specifically drawn from United States Department of Transportation laws and regulations. 
(hereinafter "DOT") DOT (See Ex, C, D, K, T, U, W, and X and T 213, 1-214, 9, 222, 13-223, 
226, 7-230,22) 
Because both the DOT and the shippers require various insurance coverages, Western 
facilitates the obtaining of both mandatory and optional coverages for the owner operators 
through a local broker. (Ex H, I-T 219, 17-220, 11 and T 223, 13-226, 6) 
To initiate commerce, Western bids to obtain a bill of lading from a manufacturer who 
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wishes to ship an oversize load. (Ex, Z) 
If an owner-driver accepts the load, Western will obtain trip permits from all states 
through which the "illegal" load will pass. These documents will describe all limiting conditions 
imposed by the affected governments for the transit. Those typically include details of routes, 
driving hours, flagging and other safety provisions. (See E AA, BB) On his self-determined 
schedule, consistent with the contract, the permits and the law, the owner-operator then picks up, 
drives and delivers the load, returning the receipt documents to Western for confirmation and 
payment. Instead of issuing checks to drivers, Western pays into an electronic clearinghouse 
account through an entity called Comdata, which is accessed by the individual drivers using their 
own debit cards. (T 220, 16-222, 12) If interstate gas tax reports or other paperwork filings are 
required post-trip, Western's office staff does that, further relieving the driver's burdens. 
Effecting the Department's self-initiated audit, agent Richard Jones, reported to 
Western's premises and interviewed only two people: the company president and its bookkeeper. 
He never spoke to a driver. He never inspected a truck and could not remember the exterior 
signage of the one truck that he may have seen. From records only, Jones believed that Western 
had "about 13" Idaho-based drivers (T 19-19) and that "some of the drivers had their own Motor 
Carrier and DOT authorities. (T 18, 17-24) Some had independent business EIN's and some used 
"dba's". (T 18, 25 - 19, 8) All drivers received independent contractor Form 1099's from 
Western, admitted Jones. (T 50 7-8) Jones never spoke to a manufacturer-consignor. He never 
contacted a consignee-purchaser. (T 116, 10-118-20) 
Instead, Mr. Jones sent written questioners to "some" drivers. Of those, "some" lesser 
number responded. (T 13, 7-9) In fact, the State placed only two such forms in evidence. (E 10, 
5 
11) One of those forms contained the several mistaken answers as identified above by driver 
Byington in his testimony. 
On the basis of this evidence, Mr. Jones wrote a seventeen page report reclassifying all 
"thirteen" drivers as employees for unemployment taxation purposes for a three year period. (E 
3) 
Among the unsupported, speculative conclusions reached in the report were these: 
1. The Carrier is in effect dictating how the job is to be done (E 3, 8) 
2. If the Carrier has the Motor Carrier authority, the Carrier also has the right to control 
how, when and where it is use. (Id) 
3. No company is going to allow a contractor to choose his own route (E 3, 9) 
4. Customers at all times thought they were dealing with the company (E 3, 11) 
5. The company controls the routes (Id) 
6. The company does dictate the contractors schedule (Id) 
7. The contractors do not have their own MC authority (E 3, 12) 
8. (The contractors) do not have a business of their own (Id) 
9. If the company lost its independent contractors, it would have to hire employees (Id) 
10. The work can only be done by an employee (Id) 
11. The company pays for insurances on the equipment (E 3, 13) 
12. The company advances money in the form of Comdata cards to the contractors (Id) 
13. No liability would be incurred by either party upon peremptory termination of the 
contract (E 3, 14) 
14. Truckers who wish to be independent contractors must obtain their own MC 
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authority (Id) 
On cross:-:examinationat hearing, Mr. Jones admitted the limitations of his field work, 
acknowledged a few over-extended conclusions, defended some inaccuracies, but did not retreat 
from his conclusion of "covered employment". Hearing Officer Kime reached the same result 
Based upon this reclassification, the Department presented Western with a bill for 
$13,277.93, in taxes and penalties. (E 3, 16) Western promptly appealed. 
The Industrial Commission then reviewed the matter de novo. Significantly, the 
Industrial Commission sided with the employer on both the issue of lack of control and the 
existence of an independent profession. In its Decision and Order ( R 22-37) the Commission, 
with eleven more precise findings of fact which duly considered the testimony and documents 
presented by Western, held that: 
1. The drivers are free from Western's control, under the terms of the contract 
and in fact, ( R 27), and 
2. Eight of the fifteen IDAPA criteria suggest a finding that Western's driver's 
are independent contractors, that 
3. Three of the criteria are neutral, although 
4. Three sets of facts argue that Western's drivers are employees, and 
5. "Although there is significant evidence to suggest that the owner/operators in 
this case are independent contractors", per the Giltner decision, "as a matter of 
law, the owner/operators are employees", and 
6. "As unreasonable as it may be, particularly to Employer in this case, it is the 
Court's majority ruling, ... that is binding on this tribunal as a matter oflaw" R 
7 
35. 
In summary,the Commission would have decided in favor of Western and against the 
Department, but for Giltner' s "per se" rule of law. 
Upon that decision, W estem appealed to this Court. 
IL 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
This matter presents the following questions for the Court: 
A. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPL YING THE PRECEDENT OF THE 
GILTNER CASE AS CONTROLLING TO THE FACTS HEREIN? 
B. WHETHER THE FACTS HEREIN AND CASES FROM IDAHO AND ELSEWHERE 
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GILTNER RULE IS WRONGLY DECIDED? 
C. WHETHER INDEPENDENT TRUCKERS CAN OPERATE USING A COLLECTIVE 
SALES, DATA AND DISBURSEMENT OFFICE WITHOUT BECOMING EMPLOYEES 
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT TAX PURPOSES? 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free review over legal 
conclusions, but will not set aside any findings of fact which are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 9, Excell Construction, Inc., v State 
Department of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 116 P3d 18, (Idaho App, 2005). The substantial and 
competence evidence standard is met if facts are such that a reasonable mind might accept them 
in support of the offered conclusion. Uhl v. Ballard Metal Products, 138 Idaho 653 67 P 3d 1265 
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(2003) However, when erroneous evidence is considered, particularly when a factual issue is 
closely contested, a case should be remanded to the factfind~r for reconsigeratignofrel~vagt 
issues without the errors. Kele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho 681, 905 P2d 82 (Idaho 
App 1995). Conclusions of fact which are clearly erroneous should and will be disturbed by this 
Court. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P3d 1238 (2002). The uncontradicted 
testimony of credible witnesses, unless inherently improbable or rendered so by other facts at the 
hearing, must be accepted as true on the record. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626-7, 603 
P2d 575, 581-2 (1979). If the Industrial Commission failed to make a proper application oflaw 
to the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court must set aside the erroneous conclusions. 
Blayneyv. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P 2d 972 (1986) 
IV. 
THE PRECEDENT OF GILTNER 
Giltner v. Idaho Department of Commerce, supra was decided by this Court in February 
of 2009. The facts therein were quite similar to those of Western. Based in Jerome, Giltner,_ Inc., 
engaged drivers to deliver hauled goods, paying them a percentage of the contract receipts 
earned. Unlike Western, Giltner had a mixed pool of drivers. Some were characterized by the 
company as employees and some as independent contractors. Of the latter, some utilized their 
own DOT authority and some used Giltner's. Upon reclassification of the latter group only, 
Giltner appealed. With Justice Burdick writing for the majority, three important and relevant 
herein holdings were issued: 
1. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN USING ADHERENCE TO FEDERAL LAW 
AND REGULATIONS AS EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYER CONTROL. 
9 
Reaffirming a line of authority which has now existed for over half a century, this Court 
reminded the labor authorities that federal and regulatory mandates are not evidence of 
employment. 
2. THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF "OTHER 
SUFFICIENT" EVIDENCE OF CONTROL OVER TYPICALLY INDEPENDENT 
TRUCKERS. 
"Furthermore there was insufficient evidence otherwise demonstrating control," this 
Court held at 145 Idaho 420. 
3. ANY TRUCKER SOLELY DEPENDENT ON AND USING ANOTHER'S DOT 
AUTHORITY COULD NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BE ENGAGED IN AN 
INDEPENDENT TRADE. 
It is solely this third holding that the Commission used to reclassify Westem's drivers. 
The Record herein is to proposed as a basis to give this Court a more concise understanding of 
how these national authorities are mandated and for what public purpose they are specified. The 
Appellant urges that this portion of the Giltner holding, on these facts, is not warranted and is 
inconsistent with and unsupportable under other case decisions by this Court and other states. As 
to this proposition, Giltner and the Commission's finding based thereon should be reversed. 
v. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE WESTERN DRIVERS ARE FACTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THOSE IN 
NATIONAL TRAILER CONVOY, WHOM THIS COURT FOUND TO BE 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 
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A nearly identical employment security contribution case was considered by this Court in 
NationalTrailerConvoy,Incv.§mpl()XffiE:11t§ecufityj\gt;:ncyofidaho,83Idaho247,360P2d994 
(1961 ). Like Western, National contracted with drivers to deliver oversized manufactured homes 
across state lines. It had a Boise operations terminal, as does Western. Both used a written contract 
to engage an independent agent to use their privately owned tractor-trucks to haul the loads for 
compensation on a mileage basis. Payment is to covers both the owner-operator's services and the 
use of the truck. The pertinent facts found in the agency hearing in National were these: 
The agreement between the corporation and the individual owner-operators 
is set forth in a written contract. The operator owns and insures his truck. 
He may hire competent drivers to operate the equipment. When other 
drivers are hired, the owner-operator must pay all applicable 
Workmen's Compensation and employer's liability insurance. However, 
nearly all of the operators with whom we are concerned own only one 
truck each and drive the trucks themselves. This is the present practice 
of the corporation. The truck must conform to the standards of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. The owner provides all insurance 
except on the cargo. All maintenance expenses, including gasoline, oil, 
tires, and repairs, are paid by the owner of the vehicle. 
The company maintains a bulletin board at each terminal listing the 
operators who are available. A haul is offered first to the driver at the 
top of the list; ifhe declines, his name may be dropped to the bottom of 
the list. 
When an operator accepts a haul, he chooses his own route and arrival time. 
After he has delivered a trailer, he may at his discretion return home, report 
to another company terminal for service, or attend to personal affairs. 
An operator may transfer from one terminal to another at his discretion. 
He reports at his convenience. Operators sometimes will not report for two 
or three weeks. One operator did not report for two months; the relationship 
was then terminated by mutual agreement. 
The owner may use his truck for other purposes as long as such uses do not 
compete with National Trailer Convoy. However, the vehicles are designed 
to haul trailers. Some operators use their trucks as second passenger cars. 
The company carries insurance on cargo in transit. In case of loss, the 
operator indemnifies the company for the first $100. If subsequent 
investigation by the company shows the driver was not at fault, he 
is reimbursed. The company requires that the operator carry a policy with 
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a $2,000 medical provision for his own protection. Maximum hours for 
drivers are set by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Operators must 
conform with these andothersafetyrequirementsoftheLC.C, They rnust 
make trip reports, and have their trucks checked every 30 days. The 
company maintains road patrols which may rule a driver off the road if his 
driving is not satisfactory. The agreement may be terminated by either 
party. However, if the operator terminates before he has made 25 trips, he 
forfeits a $50 indemnity. 
Compensation for each trailer movement is based on mileage and the 
weight and size of the trailer. The operator knows before he accepts a 
haul what the compensation will be. The operator determines where his 
truck shall be kept. He chooses his own routes and the stopping places en 
route. 
The operator may be required to collect for the haul. 
Each truck carries a permanent decal identifying it as a National Trailer 
Convoy vehicle, in conformance with regulations of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Id at 83 Idaho 250-251 
Each of the facts cited by the Supreme Court as "pertinent" above is identical or similar to 
those in the Western record. Applying the then applicable 'common-law rules" for determining the 
definition of a covered employee, this Court found an absence of employer control over the method, 
plan and details of the work, despite the use of a common ICC permit. It held the drivers to be 
independent contractors. 
The Court particularly focused on a four point test which it concluded marks of the existence 
of an independent contractor relationship: ( 1) The right to hire subordinates, (2) the ownership of 
the major items of equipment, (3) that contract termination may incur liability and (4) payment for 
a result or by the job. 
In National, then, as in Wes tern, now, the independent truckers used the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (now DOT) license of the carrier. This was neither significant, nor commented upon 
by the Supreme Court in 1961 when determining covered employment. Instead the Court then held: 
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Requirements that truck and driver meet Interstate Commerce 
Commission standards, and existence of the road patrols, point 
toward compliance with governmental regulations, and are 
not indicia of an employer-employee relationship. The drivers' 
control of his route, of the garaging and upkeep of his truck, his 
privilege of refusing a haul, all indicate the status of an independent 
contractor. Id at 83 Idaho 252. 
That holding in Western was also the genesis of the rule reiterated forty seven years later in 
the first holding of Giltner, that federal regulatory requirements are not badges of employer control. 
B. LIKEWISE THE WESTERN DRIVERS ARE AS INDEPENDENT AS THOSE FOUND 
IN HAMMOND V. DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
By 1971, the Idaho Legislature had abrogated the common-law employment test and adopted 
a statutory provision exempting from covered employment only individuals "engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession of business" and who were "free from 
control or direction in the performance ofhis work". (Then codified as Idaho Code Section 72-1316 
(1 l)(d); now it is Section 72-1316 (4)) Under that modem standard, this Court considered the 
circumstances of two moving company truckers in Hammond v. Dept of Employment, 94 Idaho 66, 
480 P 2d 912 (1971). The drivers owned their own trucks and transported household goods 
nationwide using franchiser Allied Van Lines' Interstate Commerce Commission permits. 
Again, many of the Hammond facts closely parallel the circumstances ofWestem's drivers 
in the instant case: 
During 1968, Coulter and Frei each purchased their own truck tractor 
and became long-haul operators, transporting household goods from 
one point in the United States to another. Though both men make their 
homes in the Lewiston-Moscow area and get home when they can, 
less then ten percent of the shipments they handle originate or terminate 
in this area. The truck tractors were purchased independently of Hammond 
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and the latter is in no way responsible for payments on the balance of the 
purchase contracts. The two drivers are responsible for all maintenance 
and of their maintain their own insurancepoliciesthereon, 
and may use the vehicles for their own personal use. 
All orders as to where a load is to be picked up and delivered come from 
Allied rather than from Hammond. Hammond may request through Allied 
that a driver pick up a particular load but the driver may reject such request, 
and is under no contractual obligation to accept any load. Though Allied 
does the actual scheduling, the drivers are free to pick the route they wish 
in getting from the point of origin to their destination. The drivers arrange 
their own time off whenever they wish to do so. They are responsible for 
the loading and unloading of the trailers which is not controlled or 
supervised by Hammond in any way. They purchase their own packing 
materials, hire assistants to aid them in loading and unloading the trailers, 
and pay for all expenses associated with such activities. 
Hammond has an Idaho PUC permit but no ICC permit. All shipments 
handled by Coulter and Frei are under the authority of Allied's ICC and 
Idaho PCU permits. Both drivers are subject to ICC rules and regulations 
regarding maximum driving hours, trip reports, and equipment safety checks. 
Both are licensed by Allied and must meet physical and other 
requirements established by Allied and the ICC. Transportation rates are 
set by Allied subject to ICC approval and the drivers are paid on a per-
shipment basis. Allied sends the money to Hammond who pays over to 
the drivers their share and retains an amount as rental for the use of 
his vans. The driver received 52% of the total charge made to the 
customer for loading, transportation and unloading. If the customer 
requests additional services, the driver retains 100% of the charge 
therefor. Each driver is totally responsible for damage to cargo while in 
his control and claims are deduced from payments due them. 
No federal of state income tax is withheld from payments to Coulter and 
Frei nor are deductions made for social security and similar items. They 
receive no vacation to bonus as do employees of Hammond, nor do they 
have access to Hammond warehouse facilities as do Hammond employees. 
They do not complete Hammond Company employee forms and both do 
their own bookkeeping. They pay for their own expenses on their hauls, 
and copies of their records, including itemization of expenses, are not 
required nor received by Hammond. 
Coulter and Frei both attended a school operated by Allied to train them in 
the skills of moving and driving, and both are licensed by Allied. They 
apparently have no contract with Allied, however, and haul only on Hammond 
trailers through Hammond's agency agreement with Allied. Should they 
leave Allied, their services and equipment could be employed by another 
moving company. Both Coulter and Frei consider themselves self-employed 
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and do not wish to be included under employment security coverage. 
Id. at 94 Idaho 67 
Upon these facts, the Department of Employment held the drivers to be employees, not 
independent contractors. However, the Industrial Accident Board disagreed with the Department, 
rejecting its finding of coverage. It held instead that the "record fully shows that Coulter and Frei 
were free from control or direction" and met a three point independent business test by having the 
authority to hire subordinates and owing their equipment, especially where they experienced un-
reimbursed expenses. 
Here again in Hammond, this Court has found independent truck drivers to be contractors, 
not employees, even while using a third party's ICC authority to take interstate trips, if enough 
freedom from control is present. Why then does Giltner hold to the contrary? 
C. THE FIRST HOLDING IN GLITNER PROPERLY REAFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE THAT 
ADHERENCE TO FEDERAL INTERSTATE TRUCKING LAW OR REGULATION CAN NOT 
BE EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYER CONTROL OVER A LONG HAUL TRUCKER 
As noted above, beginning in 1961 with the National precedent, this Court has recognized 
that the practice of incorporating federal regulatory requirements in contract language and course of 
dealing practices between a haul company and its solo drivers is neither evidence of private 
enterprise control nor destructive of individual independence. National, supra; Hammond, supra. 
The same holding was issued again in Hernandez v. Triple Ell Transport, Inc., 145 Idaho 37, 175 P 
3d 199 (2007) However, it was in the different context of a workers compensation claim case. 
In Hernandez, this Court specifically cited and summarized the content of several U.S. Code 
Title 49, Section 376 Code of Federal Regulation provisions dealing with mandated insurance and 
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decal labeling of the truck doors. It reminded that federal law too precludes the use of these factors 
as an employment altering test, quoting Title 49, Section CFR 376. 12 9 ( c)( 4) which clarifies that 
nothing therein "is intended to affect whether the lessor or driver provided by the lessor is an 
independent contractor or employee of the authorized carrier lessee." Id at 145 Idaho 41 
Thus, the principle of regulatory provision non-usage in unemployment determinations 
remains good law in Idaho, per Giltner and the other precedents cited. The Appellant suggests that 
a DOT license is merely another federal regulatory requirement which should determine nothing 
about "covered employment" for unemployment tax purposes. 
D. THE THIRD HOLDING GILTNER IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS DEFINING 
EMPLOYMENT ANNOUNCED IN EARLIER IDAHO CASES WHICH WERE NOT 
OVERRULED, CREATING CONFUSION 
As noted above, this Court has three times ignored the use of another's DOT authority 
interstate commerce when deciding control and independence issues for employment-type tax 
purposes. National, Hammond, and Hernandez were all decided prior to Giltner. Although 
Hammond was not mentioned in the majority decision, National and Hernandez were favorably 
cited as to the federal regulation holding and were neither overruled nor distinguished for the other 
"per se" proposition that operation under another's DOT authority eliminates the independence of 
a trade. In fact, no law, case or regulation is cited for this proposition by the majority in Giltner. 
By contrast Mr. Justice Jones in his dissent, points out that National and Hammond are nearly 
identical trucking cases which reach an opposite result from the Giltner court. This absence of 
clarity, requires action by this Court to restore predictability for the Department, the Commission 
and the affected private parties and industries. This Court should overule Giltner or distinguish the 
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other cases to avoid the current confusion. 
E. THE THIRD HOLDING IN GILTNER IS WRONGLY DECIDED AND SHOULD BE 
REVISED OR REVERSED: THE USE OF ANOTHER'S DOT AUTHORITY DOES NOT 
DESTROY THE INDEPENDENCE OF AN ESTABLISHED, FREE-STANDING OCCUPATION 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Essentially, the use of a third party's DOT authority in interstate commerce is nothing more 
than another form of compliance with federal regulation which, as this record shows does, not alter 
the habits, spirit and independence of the truck driving profession. Instead, as practiced by Western, 
the centralized DOT authority usage extended to a community of self-reliant owner/operators, merely 
provides the dual convenience of more effective marketing and relief from the oppressive burdens 
of obtaining, maintaining and submitting regulatory-compliance paperwork. 
In the hearing transcript, an overview is found which gives some particularity and removes 
some of the mystery about this overarching federal license requirement through the testimony of Mr. 
Jones, the Department's field investigator: 
Q. And so what are the specific requirements for the transport of goods 
across state lines by a trucking company? A. Well, in order to 
transport nonexempt goods across state lines a trucking company has to 
obtain an MC number, which is a Motor Carrier number, and that's an 
authority that's issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
and the Motor Carrier number is what constitutes the authority to cross state 
lines or hire as a motor carrier and all companies transporting freight for 
hire are required to obtain a Motor Carrier number. The Motor Carrier 
Act was enacted, basically, to promote safety upon conservative use 
of public highways and provide for the supervision, regulation and control 
of the use of such highways by all motor vehicles and was created to 
protect the clients and the carriers. Each motor carrier also must obtain a 
US-DOT number. A U.S. Department of Transportation number issued by 
the United States Department of Transportation. This number is the main 
tracking number for a motor carrier company. The US-DOT number 
17 
registers the number issued by the United States Department of Transportation. 
This number is the main tracking number for a motor carrier company. The 
US-DOT number registers the number of trucks, drivers, and the safety rating 
of a motor carrier company, but a US-DOT number does not constitute 
authority, it's the MC number. The Motor Carrier number. Also each motor 
carrier company must have what they call VOC-3 process agents. Process 
agents are people designated in each state that can accept legal documents on 
behalf of the motor carrier company ... 
Q. Is a carrier required to obtain liability and cargo insurance? A. Yes, they are. 
They are required to have the liability and cargo insurance that must be 
furnished by the carrier and - do you want me to continue on in answering 
another question that they - - as far as their specific requirements to 
transport goods across state lines? 
Q. I will just ask you some specific questions. A. Okay. All right Q. Do 
you know anything about the Unified Carrier Registration Act? A. Yes. 
That's an agreement that is for all states and that all motor carriers, both 
exempt as well as regulated, have to participate in that. They are subject to 
fees under the Unified Carrier Registration Act and they are - the fees are 
calculated on a company based on the number of commercial vehicles that it 
has- that it operates. Q. And must a carrier-are they required to obtain a 
fuel tax license? A. Yes. With the International Fuel Tax Act agreernent-
agreernent all carriers have to have the - be registered with IFT A, the 
International Fuel Tax Act, and they must report their miles and fuel 
usage and purchase in each state where ever they stop and their routes 
have to be recorded- there exact routes have to be recorded so that the fuel 
tax could be divided up and proportioned to the states in which they travel, 
according to the miles they travel. Q. Okay. Now, who must have DOT 
and MC numbers? A. Anybody who is doing transportation across state 
lines - carrying goods across state line has to have- they have to have their 
MC, their Motor Carrier authority, and their US-DOT numbers. Q. And is 
there an exhibit that provides that if-federal law? A. Yes, Exhibit 29 
basically states that they have to be registered and that federal law is 
USCA-13-901and13-902. Q. Okay. Would that be Title 49? 
Transportation? A. Yes, it is. Q. Okay. Do any of these drivers have 
or-drive using their own MC, DOT authority? A. There are some in the 
company that-some of the people that were reclassified that had their 
own MC authority, yes. Q. And did they drive using that MC authority? 
A. They had to drive under the authority of the MC authority of 
Western Home Transport. Q. And did some of the drivers have 
businesses with their own federal EIN or Department of Employment? 
A. Yes. Some of them had their own EIN numbers, others-
EDS Transport, Dachshund Transport, Happy Hornes, LLC. All of those 
had their own federal EIN and Department of Employment numbers. 
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POOJ/OOJ 
Q. And did some of the drivers have dba's'? A. Yes. Some of them had dba's. 
Chad McMicael. David Byington. TP Hart trucking. 
(f 13, 16-14,16 and 16, 25 M 19,8) 
This exchange confirms that the Motor Carrier authority an.d DOT registrations are nothing 
more, and nothing less, than federal regulatory burdens. Whether imposed on or lifted from a 
truckdriver's own shoulders, licensing does not change the essence of overland driving. Such 
centralized licensing is a convenience both to the national government, which ha.s fewer licenses to 
issue and monitor and to the. trucker, who maintains duties of the local, individual and corporate 
licenses and permissions only. Likewise, state road permitting and tax compliance is centralized in 
Western's office without destroying any highway independence or asserting any employermlike 
control. The workplace remains a truck cab, the job site a roadway and the result a safely, property~ 
regulated, delivered load. 
The record contains an analogy that also may be useful to the Court. Not all centralized 
trucking offices are deemed "employers" even under the current Giltn.ercriteria, concedes Mr. Jones 
for the Department: 
Q. I like that phrase trucking brokerage. What is a trucking brokerage; 
sir, in your mind? A. A trucking brokerage is a company that obtains 
loads for other motor carriers and the implication is that loads for other 
motor carriers have the authority- the MC authority. Q. Okay. 
If a trucking brokerage would do exactly what Western Homes does, 
setting aside the issue for a moment of- of MC authority, DOT licensing, 
a trucking brokerage would obtain contracts or opportunities for loads, bills 
of lading, would spin those to an independent contractor and, then, would-
would also do the paperwork associated with the delivery of that load; am 
I COITect? A. A trucking brokerage would get a load for a motor carrier, 
who is a licensed motor carrier. Q. Right. And the trucking brokerage 
would, basically, act as support for that carrier in obtaining loads 
and doing compliance paperwork. A. Well, once that load is given from the 
trucking brokerage to the motor carrier, the motor carrier and the 
client become connected up and that is the -everything goes through it 
19 
that way. Q. So, you're not using trucking brokerage as to anybody but 
a finder of contracts? A. That is correct. Q. Okay. A. A trucking 
brokerage can have his own motor carrier as well, but-but in this particular 
case with Western Horne Transport, they do not have a trucking brokerage 
license. Q. Okay. Does that require a specific DOT license? A. It's a separate 
license, yes. 
If a trucking brokerage, under separate DOT licensing, can provide fundamentally the same 
services as Western for independent-contracting drivers, what compels a different finding when we 
do exactly the same tasks to find loads and do compliance paperwork? There is simply no factual 
or legal basis, no public purpose served and no federal requirement which compels the Giltner third 
holding. 
F. COMMUNITY USE OF A CENTRAL SCHEDULER'S MC/DOT AUTHORITY IS MERELY 
A CONVENIENT METHOD OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL INTERSTATE TRUCKING 
LAW AND REGULATION, NOT EMPLOYMENT 
In fact, the truck brokerage model represents one of the only methods by which the 
independence of a small trucker can be preserved. As discussed at hearing, the significant burdens 
of road-rule compliance when driving an oversized load on state permit specified routes, with or 
without other-compelled safety equipment, during lawful times, for no more than maximum periods, 
ending at compliant parking spots while keeping up-to-date in cab logs is plenty of work for an 
unsophisticated driver. Contracting for a centralized office function, is not only smart; it is 
necessary. As the Industrial Commission concedes, this record is quite clear in disclosing that 
neither self-control nor driver independence are forfeited thereby. 
G. THE FACTS ON THIS RECORD SHOW THAT WESTERN'S CONTRACT TRUCKERS 
RETAINED AND EXERCISED TRADITIONAL "OPEN ROAD" INDEPENDENCE 
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Both truckers who testified herein, Daniel Robeson and Michael Byington, were adamant 
about their independent status. " I make a decision whether I work or don't work, where I stop and 
where I buy fuel, all that stuff. My decision", said Robeson (T74, 17-19) 
Q. Do you regard yourself as an independent contractor or an employee 
of Western? A. I'm an independent contractor of-Western just helps me 
out, I guess. I don't know. They just, you know, pay me and-they help find 
my loads and stuff. Q. You regard yourself as an independent contractor? 
A. Well, of course. I always have really. 
Q. Does the company control you when your're on the road sir? A. No. 
Sometimes I will ask for-see what the weather is. Sometimes I will call in, 
because I'm computer illiterate, and they will tell me what the wind 
conditions are, because I have been blowed over before and it kind of scares 
me. Q. Who determines when you start in the morning? A. I do. Q. Who 
detennines when you eat during the day? A. I do. Well, my stomach. 
Q And who determines when and where you fuel? A. I do. 
So testified Byington. (T 180, 14-20 and 179, 7-19) 
Neither of these witnesses was a poet or philosopher. Both were asked mostly technical 
questions, so relatively little testimony in the record captures that vaunted "spirit of the open road" 
or the reputed "independence" of thought and act often attributed to long-haul truckers. However, 
Mr. Byington comes pretty close to both in explaining the necessity for an operation like Western' s 
and his own sense of right and entitlement in the following exchanges on cross-examination: 
A. As a matter of fact, I tell the dealers- I says, hey, you know-, since 
I do such a good job, why don't you use me. I will tell them and dealer 
will tum around and tell W estem, yeah, well, we want this person to haul 
these loads only. We don't want any other drivers, because this guy does a 
good job. Q. So, they don't come directly to you-to hire you, they go 
through Western? A. I-well, they don't- the dealers don't come to me. I've 
had them call me, yes. They have before. Q. and what do you tell them 
when they call you? A. Oh, what I do is just tell me as I go-I will say, oh, 
hook up with Western and, then, they will set me up with a freight bill, 
because we can't go nowhere without a freight bill. Q. Can you- A. They 
will make me up a freight bill, so I'm legal, you know, because I-like I 
say, I'm computer illiterate, I don't know how to do that stuff. And, then, 
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they-then they figure out the pay on it, because I can't do that either. 
Q. Who is they? Is that Western figuring that out? A. Yeah. they- yeah, 
they-they help figure out stuff like that. That's what we pay them for is to 
help us. (T 191, 1-24) 
Then he is asked: 
Q. So, if you weren't working under Western you had to find-would you be 
ab le to operate on your own? A. Yeah. If I go through all that for my own 
authority and get my licensing and all that stuff and I don't know how to 
do that either, so- Q. Right now without your own authority and license or 
whatever it is that you're saying you need, could you operate on your own 
without Western? A. Well, ifl'd get a secretary I probably could and a little-
probably a lot more money to get going I probably could. Q. Okay. And so 
we were talking about your own authority. That's the MC authority-DOT 
authority; is that correct? A. Yeah. All that stuff. Yeah. I don't-year. 
It's just too-it's just too much for me. I couldn't handle it. (T 193, 9-25) 
And finally, Byington concludes: 
Q. What name is on the truck? A. What name? Q. Yeah. A. I could put my 
name on it if I wanted to. Q What name is on the truck? A. Western 
Horne Transport. Q. Okay. Is your name anywhere on that truck? A. I don't 
want my name on the truck. I could put my name- I could- I could do graffiti 
all over that truck, I could put my name on it, I can do anything I want to 
that truck, as long as it don't, you know, cause too much attraction and get 
me in trouble, you know, sort of, you know, having murals of naked women 
on there, I don't know. Q. Ms. George: I don't have any further questions. 
Thank you. (T 194, 11-25) 
The spirit of the open road of doing "anything I want to that truck" and the existence of the 
computer skills necessary to timely file complicated regulatory paperwork must co-exist in modem 
day America. In fact, the centralized office services of Western create greater, not lesser, 
independence for the truckers using this system. Western permits its drivers to be "gentlemen of the 
road," not scrivners. For that reason too, the Giltner holding does not pass scrutiny. 
H. OTHER STATES HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT A GILTNER-TYPE HOLDING IS WRONG 
The Industrial Commission alleged in its decision that other state courts have reached the 
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same conclusion that use of another's DOT authority compels a finding of covered employment for 
unemployment tax purposes. ( R 31) However, it cited only Meri ck Trucking Inc., v. Missouri Dept 
of Labor and Industrial Relations, 933 S. W. 2d 938 (1996). Therein, a Western district, 
intermediate appellate court for Missouri held upon a record of typical facts, including contract lease 
language, truck door decals and expense payments, that an "employee" designation would be 
sustained. However, the facts are anything but typical of Western's arrangement. In Merick, the 
company owned the truck, maintained the rigs, paid for the fuel, covered all insurance and put its 
own name therefore, on the cabs. Merick bore all risk of loss or damage and merely leased an 
individual truck to each driver. A single sentence makes a reference in passing to federal licensure: 
"The referee also noted that, as a practical matter, the drivers were entirely 
dependent on Merick's favor because Merick held the ICC license, Merick 
handled the billings, Merick could terminate the relationship at any time, 
and there was no evidence that the drivers ever drove for any other 
trucking firm." 
Thus, the case does not state, contrary to the Commission suggestion, that a DOT (or ICC) 
license was held, or should be held to be legally determinative. 
Perhaps this Court agrees, as it did not cite Merick as parallel authority from a sister state in 
its 2008 decision. In fact, it did not cite any case or any reason for its holding in Giltner. 
Interestingly, neither party before the Court in Giltner, through their briefing, even discussed the 
issue of a DOT authority being dispositive of the contest. Thus, no such cases were briefed before 
this case announced its rule. 
Although cited four times by Missouri courts in labor cases since 1996, Merick has never 
been used in any reported case as authority for a Giltner-type rule, Westlaw research suggests. As 
far as can be determined, only Idaho has the Giltner rule, which even here, conflicts with earlier 
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decided Idaho cases. 
There are instances, however, where other courts reviewing facts like Westem's have not 
seized upon the federal licensing status as determinative. For a period of time, the law in North 
Carolina was likewise unclear, after the Supreme Court held in Watkins v. Murrow, 253 N.C. 652, 
118 SE 2d 5 ( 1961) that an injured trucker for workers compensation law purposes, even ifhe would 
otherwise be found independent and beyond control of the lessee of his truck, must be deemed an 
"employee", if he operated under a lessee's ICC interstate authority. However, that rule has been 
rejected in Reco Transportation, Inc v. Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, 81 
N.C. App 415, 344 S.E. 2d 294 (1986) Therein, the Court of Appeals declined to extend that per se 
"workers comp" rule to unemployment compensation cases. This holding is directly in point. The 
ESC conceded that the Reco owner/operators were independent contractors at common-law. Solely 
on the basis of the Interstate Commerce Authority rule of Watkins for injury cases, the ESC asked 
the Court of Appeals to create a similar holding that cross-border drivers without their own federal 
licensing must be deemed "employees" as to unemployment taxes. The three judges unanimously 
refused to do so. Instead, they applied the traditional North Carolina test for determining employer 
control and the existence of an independent business, just as this Court should. Noting that nothing 
about trucker independence was precluded by the use of the Lessee's ICC license for interstate 
driving, the Court held: 
"In the absence of any discernible public policy or rule of common law, 
which motivated our Supreme Court to carve out an exception to the 
general rule for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act as set forth 
in Hennis, supra, we decline to further extend the exception stated therein. 
We hold that the evidence does not support the findings made by the ESC 
and the findings made thereby are insufficient to support the ESC's 
conclusions that the drivers in question are employees of RECO for 
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purposes of (unemployment insurance) Id at 344 S.E. 2d 297 
(citations omitted) 
A recent Washington case also emphasizes that ICC authority is merely one other factor a 
court might consider in determining employment, or not, on statutory criteria. In Penick v. 
Employment Security Department, 82 Wash App 30, 917 P 2d 136 (1996) the Court of Appeals of 
Washington sustained an administrative finding of employee status for truckers who drove wood 
shakes across the Northwest to Northern California using the truck owner's ICC authority. In 
applying a three prong statutory test, the Court did not comment on the centralized ICC authority 
whatsoever. 
To the same effect, although the facts are not as fully developed, the Court of Appeals of 
New York, in Lafayette Storage and Moving v. Hartnett, 77 NY 2d 823, 566 N.Y S. 2d 198 (1991) 
remanded a case for further proceedings which involved interstate Atlas Van Lines drivers without 
adopting a per se rule. Instead, the appellate court simply wanted more evidence on the independent 
contract status of certain employees. 
Likewise, Wisconsin cheese haulers who deliver "outbound loads", apparently interstate, 
were held to be independent owner operators and not employees. The Court of Appeals made no 
mention of DOT /ICC licensing and applied typical control and independence test instead. Wisconsin 
Cheese Service, Inc. v. Dept. oflndustry, Labor and Human Relations, 115 Wis 2 d 573, 340 N-W 
2 d 908 (1983) An earlier Wisconsin case reaches the same result. See Star Line Trucking v. 
Department oflndustry, Labor and Human Relations, 109 Wis 2d 266, 325 NW 2d 872 (1982) (the 
dissent of Justice Abrahamson at 325 NW 2d 882 mentions that the independent contractors can 
operate under a single ICC certificate) 
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Although not involving a national license, a Southwestern case sets up an analogous state-
level situation. Smith v. Arizona Dept of Economic Security 128 AZ 21, 123 P 2d 810 (1980) 
involved a central office which contracted with truckers to move and set up mobile homes within 
that state's boundaries. Only the Smiths possessed the Arizona certificate of convenience and 
necessity- their contract lease drivers did not. The truckers operated under that single license without 
obtaining their own. The same managerial services and booking functions done here by Western 
were performed at the Smith offices. The Arizona Court of Appeals simply performed the typical 
statutory control review in that case and found no employer-employee relationship in the absence 
of control. In other words, the possession and use of a state authority collectively was not a "per se 
event." 
Finally, under yet another context, the United States District Court for Idaho recently opined 
on the effect of an "employer's" DOT authority on its "employees". It is factually and legally 
dissimilar to our situation, but contains dicta worthy of reflection. In Shoemaker v. United Parcel 
Service, 2011WL836998, an employee was classified as exempt from overtime pay under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act by UPS. When the employee complained, UPS contended that it set delivery 
standards in accord with U.S. Department of Transportation requirements. As a salaried, on-road 
supervisor, Shoemaker, :frequently working more than 40 hours a week, felt that he should get 
overtime pay. However, under the Federal Motor Carrier Act Exemption, ifhe was acting as a driver 
covered by that Act, no overtime would be awarded. In reasoning to a conclusion on this question, 
Federal Magistrate Candy W. Dale notes: 
"For a motor carrier to fall within the DOT's jurisdiction, it must transport 
passengers or property in interstate commerce ... However, simply 
because an employer might fall under the DOT's authority, not all of its 
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employees will fall under the DOT's authority by virtue of their 
employment" (citations omitted). 
While of no precedential or even logical value, those two sentences do well express the 
concept that the delink:ing of the mere existence of DOT Ii censure from unintended consequences 
should be contemplated in employment cases. Simply because Giltner and Western agreed to 
assume umbrella DOT licensure responsibility should not affect either their employees or their 
independent contractors. The existence of such a license should not define, at law, anything more 
than the duties of the license holder to the DOT. Giltner, Holding Three, is wrongly decided. 
VI. 
REQUEST FOR FEES AND COSTS 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Western requests this Court to award its attorneys fees 
and costs incurred on appeal. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
For each all of the above-urged reasons, the Appellant asks this Honorable Court to reverse 
the holding below, to declare the truckers associated with Western to be independently employed, 
no tax due and, if necessary, remand this matter to the Industrial Commission for further consistent 
proceedings. 
DATED This day of May, 2013. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
David H. Leroy, Attorney for he Appellant 
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